Consider exchange economies in which preferences are continuous, convex and strongly monotonic. It is well known that the Walrasian correspondence is not Nash implementable: Maskin monotonicity (Maskin, 1999) is violated for Walrasian allocations on the boundary of the feasible set. We derive an impossibility result showing that the Walrasian correspondence is in fact not implementable in any of the solution concepts considered in the implementation literature.
Introduction
The question of the implementation of the Walrasian correspondence has received much attention over the past decades. While the Walrasian correspondence satis…es desirable requirements -e.g. e¢ ciency, individual rationalityits strategic properties are much less appealing. Hurwicz (1972) shows that agents would not …nd it in their interest to honestly report their preferences or demand functions to the so-called auctioneer: the Walrasian correspondence is not strategy-proof. The news is not better even if agents have complete information about one another and behave according to the Nash equilibrium criterion. Hurwicz, Maskin and Postlewaite (1995) show that Maskin monotonicity (Maskin, 1999 ; …rst version dated 1977), a necessary condition for implementation of a social choice correspondence (henceforth, SCC) in Nash equilibrium, is violated by the Walrasian correspondence for allocations that are at the boundary of the feasible set. The Walrasian correspondence is badly behaved because it also depends on the shape of preferences outside of the feasible set. This is what generates the so-called boundary problem.
Two early papers in the literature on Nash implementation of the Walrasian correspondence, Hurwicz (1979) and Schmeidler (1980) , go around the violation of Maskin monotonicity by constructing mechanisms in which allocations obtained o¤ the equilibrium path may award unfeasible bundles with negative quantities to some agents. 1 Giraud and Rochon (2001) construct an alternative mechanism that respects feasibility but rules out Walrasian allocations on the boundary. Alternatively, the literature also paid attention to the Nash implementation of the constrained Walrasian correspondence -see for instance Postlewaite and Wettstein (1989) , Dutta,Sen and Vohra (1995) , Tian (1992 Tian ( , 2000 , or Sotskov (2003) . 2 Consistent with the notion of Walrasian equilibrium, in each of these papers, strategy sets include announcements of allocations and prices. In a di¤erent literature, papers on non-cooperative bargaining such as Gale (1986, a and b), or more recently Kunimoto and Serrano (2004) provide implementation in subgame perfect equilibrium of the Walrasian correspondence for economies with a continuum of agents. However, Walrasian allocations on the boundary of the feasible sets are also ruled out. Finally, Yildiz (2003) considers a bargaining procedure that covers only the two-player case, and uses assumptions such as uniqueness and interiority of Walrasian allocations. To the best of our knowledge, the papers on non-cooperative bargaining are the only one in this literature that use sequential mechanisms.
We know that the class of implementable SCCs considerably expands when one considers re…nements of Nash equilibrium as solution concepts. For instance, in their seminal papers, Moore and Repullo (1988) (MR in the sequel) and Abreu and Sen (1990) (henceforth AS) show that Maskin monotonicity is no longer necessary for implementation in subgame perfect equilibrium. In MR, it is claimed that the Walrasian Correspondence is implementable in subgame perfect equilibrium when preferences are continuous, convex, and monotonic. In contradiction with their claim, we …rst show that, without further restrictions, the boundary problem generates an impossibility. Indeed, the Walrasian correspondence de…ned over this class of economies is in fact not implementable in any responsive game theoretic solution concept -and therefore not implementable in any of the solution concepts commonly studied in the literature. 3 Next, we show that, by excluding non-di¤erentiable preferences, the Walrasian correspondence is implementable in subgame perfect equilibrium. 4 We then proceed to solve the boundary problem. Because MR and AS construct a canonical mechanism for the entire class of SCCs that are implementable in subgame perfect equilibrium, we could simply rely on their construction. 5 Nevertheless, once a speci…c SCC of interest has been identi…ed, this mechanism is not very appealing. It involves each agent reporting preference pro…les, which are in…nite-dimensional objects. Also, since this mechanism is not designed for any particular SCC, it does not capture the speci…c characteristics of the Walrasian correspondence.
However, for Nash implementation, Saijo (1988) and McKelvey (1989) show that the size of strategy sets in general mechanisms can be reduced. In particular, McKelvey (1989) shows that announcements of preference pro…les are not necessary. While such reduction remains an open question for implementation in subgame perfect equilibrium, it is possible to follow a similar approach for speci…c SCCs and use tailor-made strategy sets -see for instance Serrano and Vohra (2002) who, in the context of exchange economies, provide a mechanism to implement the bargaining set in subgame perfect equilibrium.
Our position is that a mechanism is appealing if (i) in equilibrium, agents always get what they asked for, (ii) announcements of preference pro…les are not part of the strategy sets of agents, and (iii) the mechanism corresponds closely to the description of the correspondence studied.
Our mechanism is simple, appealing, and it doubly implements the Walrasian correspondence in subgame perfect and strong subgame perfect equilibrium. Importantly, our construction is based on the notion of allocations, prices, and moves along price hyperplanes, which are central in the story behind the Walrasian correspondence. Recall that a pair composed of a feasible allocation and a price vector is a Walrasian equilibrium if each agent gets, at that allocation, the best bundle he can obtain in his budget set: no agent wants to "move" and get a di¤erent bundle on his budget hyperplane. This fundamental property is problematic for allocations that are on the boundary of the feasible set: moves along price hyperplanes can lead to bundles that are unfeasible. The mechanism we construct allows a better understanding of the strategic issues at stake when solving the boundary problem. Interestingly, in contrast to implementation in Nash equilibrium, a change in the property of a boundary allocation when going from one preference pro…le to another -from Walrasian to not being Walrasian-is revealed through di¤erences in the upper contour sets at that allocation.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we present the set-up. In Section 3, we prove our impossibility result. In Section 4, we present the mechanism and the implementation result. We provide some …nal comments in Section 5.
2 The set-up
Economic environments
There is a set N f1; :::; ng, n 2; of agents, and a set L f1; :::;`g of in…nitely divisible goods. For each i 2 N , let R`+ be agent i's consumption set. For each i 2 N , let R i be a complete and transitive binary relation on R`+ indicating (weak) preferences. Let the associated strict preference and indi¤erence relations be P i and I i . For each i 2 N , let R i be agent i's set of possible preferences. Let R = Q i R i be the set of preference pro…les. A typical preference pro…le is a list R = (R i ) i2N 2 R. For each i 2 N , let ! i 2 R`+ n f0g be i's individual endowment. The aggregate endowment is ! = P ! i 0. 6 Each i 2 N is fully characterized by R i and ! i . The only characteristics of agents unknown to the planner are the preferences. An economy is thus a preference pro…le.
We consider the following two domains of economies.
is continuous, convex and strongly monotonic.
is convex, strongly monotonic and representable by a di¤erentiable utility function.
A feasible allocation is a list of bundles (x i ) i2N 2 R`n + such that P x i !. Given i 2 N , let x il 2 R + be the l-th coordinate of x i .
Let A fx 2 R`n + : P x i !g be the set of feasible allocations. Let @A fx 2 A : for some i 2 N and some l; m 2 L, x il = ! l , x im > 0g be the (upper) boundary of A. Likewise, let A = A n @A fx 2 A : for each i 2 N and l 2 L, either 0 x il < ! l , or x il = ! l implies that for each m 6 = l, x im = 0g be the interior of A.
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For each i 2 N , let A i ; @A i , and A i be the projections of A, @A and A onto agent i's consumption set. 6 We order vectors with the usual conventions, , >, . 7 A preference relation R i de…ned over R+ is convex if, for each fx i ; y i g R+ such that x i P i y i , we have that for each 2 (0; 1], x i + (1 )y i P i y i . A preference relation R i de…ned over R+ is strongly monotonic if, for each fx i ; y i g R+, x i > y i implies that x i P i y i . 8 Notice that our de…nition of interiority is not strictly speaking the interior of A since some corners of the Edgeworth box may be included in A . We nevertheless stick to this terminology for convenience.
For each x 2 @A, let J(x) fi 2 N : x i 2 @A i g be the set of agents who receive a bundle x i on the boundary of the feasible set.
Let F fx 2 R`n + : P x i = !g be the set of balanced allocations. A price vector is p 2 R`+ such that P p l = 1. Let fp 2 R`+ : P p l = 1g be the price simplex and + fp 2 R`+ + : P p l = 1g the set of strictly positive price vector.
For each i 2 N; each z i 2 A i , and each p 2 , let B i (p; z i ) x i 2 R`+ : p x i p z i be the budget set of agent i at price p and bundle z i , and B i (p; z i ) \ A i fx i 2 A i : p x i p z i g his constrained budget set at price p and bundle z i .
For each x 2 @A, each p 2 + and each
+ n fpg : there exists y i 2 A i n fx i g such that p 0 y i = p 0 x i and p y i > p ! i g be the set of prices at which i can attain bundles
10 For each R 2 R, let W E(R) be the set of these allocation-price pairs.
A social choice correspondence is a mapping f : R A that associates to each preference pro…le a non-empty subset of feasible allocations.
The Walrasian correspondence W : R A associates to each economy R 2 R its set of Walrasian allocations W (R).
To conclude, we recall the de…nition of Maskin monotonicity and the necessary condition C for subgame perfect implementation introduced in MR. 9 This de…nition will be explained in Section 4 and Figure 3 . 10 Notice that, both in R C and R D , preferences are strongly montonic. Thus, for each Walrasian equilibrium (x; p), we have p 2 + .
Maskin monotonicity: For each fR; R 0 g R and each a 2 f (R),
Condition C: For each fR; R 0 g R and each a 2 f (R) n f (R 0 ), there exists a …nite sequence (a l ) k+1 l=1 of elements of A such that, a) For each l = 0; :::; k 1, there exists j 2 N for whom,
Game-form: de…nitions and notation
Let T be a game tree. Let S be the set of nodes of T , s 0 the initial node, and Z the set of terminal nodes. For each i 2 N , let M i be the set of (pure) strategies, and for each s 2 S, let M s i be the set of strategies available to i at node s 2 S. Let M Q i M i be the set of strategy pro…les. As is common in the implementation literature, we con…ne our attention to pure strategies. Let g, the outcome function, be a function that associates a feasible allocation with each path of play. An extensive mechanism (N; T; g) -or extensive game form-is a game with possibly simultaneous moves. 11 Let m 2 M . Let g(m) be the allocation prescribed by the path induced by m, and g i (m) the i-th component of g(m). Let g(m; s) be the allocation corresponding to m starting at node s. Let G be the set of mechanisms.
Let 2 G. Given R 2 R, de…nes a non-cooperative game in extensive form ( ; R). For each R 2 R, a game-theoretic solution concept E (henceforth solution concept) describes a set of predictions on how will be played, as a function of the agents'preferences. It is a mapping E : G R 2 M . For each R 2 R, let E( ; R) and EO( ; R) be the set of E-equilibrium and Eequilibrium outcomes of ( ; R). The de…nition of solution concepts is indeed very broad and encompasses many concepts in which agents do not behave "strategically". In order to narrow the de…nition, we introduce the minimal requirement on a solution concept.
Responsiveness: E is responsive with respect to 2 G if for each fR; R 0 g R and each x 2 EO( ; R) n EO( ; R 0 ), there exist i 2 N and fy i ; z i g A i such that, y i R i z i and z i P 0 i y i : Observe that all the solution concepts commonly studied in the implementation literature -such as Nash equilibrium and any of its re…nements-are responsive.
We de…ne next the solution concepts that we consider in the paper. Let R 2 R and 2 G.
A subgame perfect equilibrium of ( ; R) is m 2 M such that for each s 2 S n Z, each i 2 N; and each m i 2 M i ,
Let SP E( ; R) and SP EO( ; R) be the set of subgame perfect equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of ( ; R).
A strong equilibrium of ( ; R) is m 2 M such that for each H N , each m 0 6 = m with, for each i 2 N n H, m i = m 0 i , then there is j 2 H for whom,
A strong subgame perfect equilibrium of ( ; R) is m 2 M such that for each proper subgame, m is a strong equilibrium in that subgame. Let SSP E( ; R) and SSP EO( ; R) be the set of strong subgame perfect equilibrium and strong subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of ( ; R).
A SCC f is doubly implemented by in subgame perfect and strong subgame perfect equilibrium if for each R 2 R we have, SSP EO( ; R) = SP EO( ; R) = f (R).
We de…ne next the more general notion of implementability of a SCC f .
Implementability: There exist and a solution concept E; responsive with respect to ; such that f is implemented by in E.
We need to introduce one last piece of notation. For each i 2 N , let i 2 R`+ n f0g be such that ! i i 2 R`+ n f0g. Such an i exists since we assumed that for each i 2 N , ! i > 0. Let P be the set of one-toone functions -permutations-from N into itself, and let P n be the set of permutation pro…les. For each i 2 N , let i 2 P be a permutation and ( i ) i2N . For each 2 P n ; let f ( ) 1 ( 2 (: : : ( i : : : ( n )) : : :) be the ordered composition of the permutations in . We call f ( ) a protocol. For each 2 P n , let f i ( ) be the i-th agent in f ( ) -i.e. f 1 ( ) is the …rst agent, f n ( ) the last agent in the protocol etc.
For
Permutations will be used as components of strategy sets and will play a role similar to integer devices found in many of the mechanisms used in the literature. However, unlike integer devices, P is a …nite set which allows us to have …nite strategy sets in the mechanism we construct in Section 4.
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Permutations capture here an idea of anonymity of the mechanismequilibria should be independent of protocols-and work as a "king-maker" process because protocols will determine who will lead the game if it goes beyond Stage 1 of our mechanism. A similar device was used in Serrano and Vohra (1997) . Permutations were used …rst as components of strategy spaces in the context of implementation, but in a di¤erent fashion, in Thomson (2005;  …rst version dated 1995).
An impossibility Result
Given any responsive solution concept, implementability of a SCC requires the following property to be satis…ed.
Justi…ed sensitivity: For each fR; R 0 g R and each a 2 f (R) n f (R 0 ), there exist i 2 N and fx i ; y i g A i such that,
12 See Jackson (1992) for a criticism of integer games.
Justi…ed sensitivity is a basic necessary condition for a SCC to be implemented in some responsive solution concept. 13 
14 When the domain of preference pro…les is R C , the Walrasian correspondence violates justi…ed sensitivity, and hence violates implementability. 15 The problem we underline here also applies to public good economies and the Lindhal correspondence. Proposition 1 below can be adapted to that case.
Proposition 1: Suppose the domain is R
C and n 2. Then the Walrasian correspondence violates implementability. Proof: ). Observe that z 2 W (R) with supporting price p . The situation is depicted in Figure 1 . 13 The reader may have noticed that a preference change from R to R 0 could also simply imply the existence of i 2 N and fx i ; y i g A i such that x i P i y i and y i I 0 i x i . By continuity and strong monotonicity of preferences, this implies that there exists fw i ; z i g A i such that w i R i z i and z i P 0 i w i . Therefore, whenever R 6 = R 0 , the structure of the model and the assumptions on preferences guarantee that, if preferences change within A, there always exists a "real" preference reversal in A.
14 Therefore, when a SCC f violates justi…ed sensitivity, the only hope to have f implemented is to use some non-responsive solution concepts. For instance, let T ruth be the truthtelling solution concept -i.e. agents always report truthfully-and be the direct mechanism in which g = f and, for each i 2 N , M i = R i . Trivially, for each R 2 R; T ruthO( ; R) = f (R). 15 The violation of justi…ed sensitivity implies that the Walrasian correspondence cannot be virtually implemented in any responsive solution concept. See Abreu and Sen (1991) for a de…nition of virtual Nash implementation. Since z = 2 W (R 0 ), implementability requires justi…ed sensitivity. However, there does not exist i 2 N and fx i ; y i g A i such that x i R i y i and y i P 0 i x i . It is easy to see that the proof can be extended to any n and`. 16 
Q.E.D.
By considering the domain R D , the pathologies uncovered in Proposition 1 disappear. 17 Di¤erentiability of preferences guarantees that local information around z can be used to construct a sequence (a l ) k+1 l=1 of elements of A as required by condition C. To see this, consider fR; R 0 g R D and z 2 W (R) n W (R 0 ) as shown in Figure 2 . We can now identify fz ; x; yg A such that,
When di¤erentiability is imposed, IC(R 1 ; z 1 ) \ A 1 and IC(R
. Excluding non-di¤erentiable preference relations from the domain, we do not need further restrictions to implement the Walrasian correspondence in subgame perfect equilibrium. 16 It is clear that the domain R R C of preferences does not have to be a cartesian product for the proof to go through. 17 Obviously, even with this domain restriction, the Walrasian correspondence is not Nash implementable since corner Walrasian allocations are not excluded. 
Taking care of the boundary problem
We now work with the di¤erentiable domain R D . The mechanism we construct has three stages. At stage 1, agents simultaneously announce an allocation, a price and a permutation. First, for each R 2 R D , and each (x; p) 2 A + , the information contained locally in prices is enough to determine whether (x; p) 2 W E(R): If (x; p) = 2 W E(R), there exist i 2 N and y i 2 B i (p; ! i ) \ A i such that y i P i x i . 18 The possibility of moves along budget hyperplanes is an important feature of our construction. 19 Accordingly, our mechanism always stops at Stage 1 if announced allocations are in A .
However when x 2 @A, this device does not work anymore because moves along price hyperplanes can lead to infeasible bundles. To circumvent this problem, we still rely on the information contained locally in prices, but we use an alternative idea of retrading. This is where sequentiality comes into play. To see this, let us look at Figure 3 . There is fR;
s ! Figure 3 and p y 1 > p ! 1 . Hence, 1 2 J(z ) and p 0 2 T 1 (p ; z ). When agent 1 has preferences R 1 , there exists
Notice that we use a new constrained budget set B 1 (p 0 ; z 1 ) \ A 1 where z 1 plays the role of agent 1's endowment -hence the idea of retrading. But when agent 1 has preferences R 0 1 , there does not exist y 1 
would create pro…table retrading opportunities for agent 1 in B 1 (p 0 ; z 1 ) \ A 1 . Whenever agents agree on an allocation x 2 @A, the game continues to Stage 2 and agent f 1 ( ) is given the opportunity to reveal whether x is Walrasian for the true preference pro…le. The revelation is made possible because, for each fR;
Interestingly, in contrast to implementation in Nash equilibrium, for the boundary problem, a change in the property of an allocation x 2 @A when going from one preference pro…le R to another R 0 -from being Walrasian to not being Walrasian-is revealed through di¤erences in the upper contour sets at that allocation.
We now present formally our mechanism. It is de…ned for n 3 agents.
For each i 2 N; select an i 2 R`+ n f0g such that ! i i 2 R`+ n f0g.
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Mechanism
, and f n ( ) gets the 0 bundle, or (ii) if p x
4) In all other cases, the game stops, 2) In all other cases, the game stops and the outcome is x.
If he chooses y k = x k , he gets it and agent f 1 ( ) gets
( ! x k x f 1 ( ) ) and agent f n 1 ( ) gets the 0 bundle.
2) If he chooses y k 6 = x k , he gets it. Agent f 1 ( ) gets the 0 bundle and each j 2 N n ff 1 ( ); kg gets
We can now proceed to the main theorem of the paper.
Theorem 1: Suppose the domain is R D and that n 3. Then, the Walrasian correspondence is doubly implemented by in subgame perfect and strong subgame perfect equilibrium.
20 Individual epsilons are parameters of this mechanism. 21 That is, p 0 2 + is such that there exist feasible bundles
The proof is divided into two parts. First part: SP EO( ; R) W (R).
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Let m 2 SP E( ; R) with m
Since preferences are strongly monotonic, ! k > 0, and for each j 2 N , j > 0, this is a pro…table deviation for agent k. Thus, m = 2 SP E( ; R). Next, if p x 0 i 6 = p ! i , the game stops and each
Since preferences are strongly monotonic, ! k > 0; and for each j 2 N , j > 0; this is a pro…table deviation for agent k. Thus m = 2 SP E( ; R).
Case 2 : Either (i) There exist ( x; p) 2 A + and k f n ( ) such that for each j 2 N n ff n ( )g, (x j ; p j ) = ( x; p), and (x k ; p k ) 6 = ( x; p); or (ii) There exists fi; j; kg N such that (x i ; p i ) 6 = (x j ; p j ) 6 = x k ; p k : In either case, the game stops, each j 2 N n ff 1 ( ); f n ( )g gets g j (m) = ! j , and g fn(
. Since preferences are strongly monotonic, ! k > 0, and for each j 2 N , j > 0; this is a pro…table deviation for agent k. Thus, m = 2 SP E( ; R).
Proof : Suppose not. The game stops at Stage 1 with g(m) = x 2 A but ( x; p) = 2 W E(R). By de…nition of a Walrasian equilibrium, convexity of preferences and the fact that x 2 A , there exist k 2 N and x
, and for each j 2 k ; m k ) = x as outcome. Remember that for each j 2 N , x j > 0 since ! j > 0, p x j = p ! j and p 2 + . Hence, by deviating, agent k gets x k > 0. By strong monotonicity of preferences, this is a pro…table deviation for agent k. Thus, m = 2 SP E( ; R).
Proof : Suppose not. The game stops at stage 2 with g(m) = x 2 @A but ( x; p) = 2 W E(R). There are two cases to consider. Case 1 : g(m) = x but there exists i 2 N for whom, Case 2 : g(m) = x but there exists i 2 N for whom,
Since Case 1 is ruled out, we have that if
( ! x i x k ). Since for each j 2 N , x j > 0, and preferences are strongly monotonic, this is a pro…table deviation for agent k. Thus, m = 2 SP E( ; R).
Second part: W (R) SSP EO( ; R).
Let (x; p) 2 W E(R). Then the following pro…le of strategy supports x as SSPE outcome of ( ; R). Let ( x; p) be the unanimously agreed price-allocation pair. Let C fi 2
(ii) At Stage 2, agent f 1 ( ) makes the following announcement: 
It is clear that agent k is playing a best response at Stage 3. Agent k chooses the bundle he prefers between x k and every possible y k on the budget hyperplane of B k (p 0 ; x k ): In case of indi¤erence, he favors agent f 1 ( ) and chooses x k . 24 Given ( x; p) agreed upon at Stage 1 and the protocol f ( ), notice that f 1 ( ) is also playing a best response at Stage 2. He announces p 0 6 = p only if there exists k 2 N nff 1 ( )g for whom
= f x k g; and such that there is x 0 k 2 B k ( p; ! k ) \ SU C k (R k ; x k ) 23 Since the outcome that f 1 ( ) gets at stage 3 can depend on the bundle that k gets, the optimal choice for f 1 ( ) is to choose k 2 C who is awarded the smallest bundle at x. 24 This situation could happen o¤ the equilibrium path.
and l 2 L with x 0 kl > ! l . By doing so, agent f 1 ( ) obtains x f 1 ( ) + 1 n 2 ( ! x k x f 1 ( ) ) > x f 1 ( ) . Whenever this condition is not satis…ed, one of the best response of f 1 ( ) is to announce p 0 = p and to choose f 2 ( ). Moreover, observe that a joint deviation by f 1 ( ) and k cannot make both agents better o¤ at Stage 3. Finally, recall that for each Walrasian equilibrium (x; p), allocation x is individually rational, e¢ cient, and such that for each i 2 N , B i (p; ! i ) \ SU C i (R i ; x i ) = ;. Thus, each deviation by a coalition H N results in the same outcome -for instance if agents modify the permutation they each announce-or in an outcome at which not all members of H are strictly better-o¤ than at the Walrasian allocation. Therefore, the pro…le of strategies described is a strong subgame perfect equilibrium of ( ; R).
Hence, on the equilibrium path, each i 2 N announces (x i ; p i ) = (x; p) 2 W E(R). If x 2 A , the game stops at Stage 1 and g(m) = x. Otherwise, it goes to Stage 2 where m Remark 1 In the previous section, we underlined that the issue raised in Proposition 1 applies to the Lindhal correspondence. The mechanism we use here can be adapted to the public goods case to implement the Lindhal correspondence.
Conclusion
We have shown that, without di¤erentiability of preferences, the Walrasian correspondence is not implementable in any of the game theoretical solution concepts commonly considered in the implementation literature. The boundary problem generates an impossibility result. Imposing di¤erentiability of preferences, we constructed a mechanism that takes care of the boundary problem and doubly implements the Walrasian correspondence in subgame perfect and strong subgame perfect equilibrium. Our mechanism is based on price-allocation announcements and corresponds closely to the description of Walrasian equilibrium: moves along price hyperplanes are at the heart of the Walrasian equilibrium concept. The mechanism allows for a better understanding of the strategic issues attached to the boundary problem.
Finally, our mechanism can be extended to incomplete information settings by incorporating announcements of types at Stage 1 as well as statecontingent prices and allocations. An interesting issue would be to analyze the information transmission that occurs across stages and to characterize an extension of the Walrasian correspondence to incomplete information settings. Bochet (2006) follows a similar approach using a static mechanism. He …nds ambiguous connections between Walrasian and Rational Expectations equilibria.
